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BA TSON v. KENTUCKY: CAN THE 'NEW' PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE SURVIVE THE RESURRECTION OF
STRA UDER v. WEST VIRGINIA?
It cannot be denied that our jury selection process' has lent itself to in-
vidious racial discrimination in the selection of jurors who ultimately decide
the black defendant's guilt or innocence.2 This practice manifested itself in a
line of decisions3, beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia4. The Strauder
Court held that excluding qualified venirepersons5 on the basis of race violated
the fourteenth amendment. However, the Supreme Court's refusal in Swain v.
Alabama' to subject petit jury peremptory challenges7 to constitutional
scrutiny spawned much criticism from courts8 and commentators.' As a result,
the Court in Batson v. Kentucky" decided to re-examine the role the peremp-
tory challenge plays in exacting justice between the State and the accused.
'The jury selection process consists of several stages. First, a list of eligible jurors is compiled by means of
voter registration lists, directories, a key-man system, or other similar methods. From these various pools, a
venire, or group of potential jurors is randomly selected for service during a particular court term. After ex-
cuses for hardship, health, or similar reasons, the venire is examined. Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory
Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 339 n. I I
(1982) [citing Simon & Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION,
211, 214-217 (S. Nagel ed. 1972)1. Examination of the jurors is referred to as voir dire, a process that enables
opposing counsel to determine the impartiality of prospective jurors. During voir dire, jurors can be removed
through challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause are exercised on narrow,
specific, and provable grounds, while peremptory challenges have traditionally allowed counsel to excuse
jurors for any reason, or no reason at all. See Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse
of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979); J.M. VAN DYKE. JURY SELECTION PRO-
CEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS. 139-175 (1977).
'Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike At Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974) (pointing out the presence of racial discrimination against jurors since
Congress passed laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the selection process in 1875); See also Rose v. Mit-
chell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (explaining that racial discrimination as it relates to the administration of justice
has been present in the United States since the War Between the States.)
'Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977); Carter v. Jury Com., 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (per curiam);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559 (1953); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hollins
v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
'100 U.S. 303 (1880).
'See note I supra and accompanying text.
6380 U.S. 202 (1965).
'See note I supra and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
(Court "reluctantly" held that Swain was still good law.)
'See generally Brown, McGuire, & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in
Criminal Trials: Traditional Use orAbuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Winick, ProsecutorialPeremp-
tory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study anda Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L.
REV. I, (1982); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968); Comment,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetration of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV.
1157 (1966); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE
L.J., 1715 (1977); Note, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
477 (1984).
*106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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In Batson, a black man was convicted of second degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods." During voir dire examination of the jurors, the pros-
ecutor peremptorily challenged all four black persons on the venire, and an all-
white jury was seated. 2 Defense counsel at trial and throughout the appellate
process argued that the removal of the four black venirepersons violated Bat-
son's sixth 3 and fourteenth amendment"' rights. The Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky affirmed Batson's conviction. 5
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that a defendant
may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of
the petit jury. 6 To establish a prima facie case,
[Tihe defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group"7 and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact, to which there can be no dispute, that peremp-
tory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."' 8 Finally, the defendant
.must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen
from the petit jury on account of their race."
Essentially, the defendant establishes a prima facie case of petit jury
discrimination if he shows that peremptory challenges were used to exclude
venirepersons of a cognizable racial group of which the defendant is also a
member." The second "prong" of the test is simply recognition that the
peremptory challenge is a vehicle for racial discrimination,2' while the third
prong allows a defendant to offer any other facts germane to the discrimina-
tion issue.22
Batson 's most important aspect is the burden of proof it places on the state
"Id. at 1715.
12Id.
"See Batson. 106 S. Ct. at 1716 n.4. Petitioner Batson argued before the Court that the prosecutor's use of
the peremptory challenges violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury.
Two state court decisions, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), and
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) had carved out
sixth amendment limitations on the peremptory challenge. However, the Court expressed no view on peti-
tioner's sixth amendment arguments, and rather decided Batson on equal protection grounds. Id. at 1716
n.4.
'See supra note I I and accompanying text.
"Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. at 1715.
16Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
"Id. at 1723 [citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)].
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once a defendant establishes a prima facie case. A prosecutor must put forth a
"neutral explanation . . . related to the particular case to be tried."23 An ex-
planation that the challenged jurors would be partial to the defendant because
of their shared race 4 is insufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case.
This holding is fundamentally at odds with the nature of the peremptory
challenge, one historically requiring no explanation, and exerciseable "without
being subject to the court's control."2
A RETREAT FROM SWAIN
Batson 's significance is better understood when compared to the historical
view of peremptory challenges as expressed in Swain v. Alabama." The Court
in Swain focused on the efficacy of the flexible peremptory as a means of
"eliminat[ing] extremes of impartiality"27 between the state and the accused.
Because it allowed trial litigants to reject potential jurors for "real or imagined
partiality"28 based on "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices,"29 or
on grounds of race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliation, the peremp-
tory striking of blacks in a particular case was not violative of equal
protection. 0 To so hold would emasculate the peremptory, which "must be ex-
ercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose. ' For these reasons, the
Court created a presumption that the prosecutor exercised peremptory chal-
lenges properly32 and foreclosed constitutional scrutiny of the reasoning for the
challenge.3
The presumption of propriety was not overcome by showing that the
prosecutor challenged black jurors simply because they were black. 4 In
essence, the Court sanctioned the use of stereotypes in the petit jury selection
process." Only upon showing that the prosecutor ". . . in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
victim may be, is responsible for the removal of [blacks] . .. selected as
2Id.
24Id.
'Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
26380 U.S. 202 (1965); See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1725 n.25 (1986), where the Court explained
that any principles in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) contrary to Batson were overruled.
"Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
1d. at 220.
1Id. [quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)].
"Swain, 380 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 219 [quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 353).
2Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
33See id.
'
4Saltzburg and Powers, supra note 1, at 343.
"See id. at 338-42.
RECENT CASESFall, 19861
3
Wilson: Batson v. Kentucky
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
qualified jurors... "36 would equal protection be violated.37 Essentially, Swain
required a showing that the prosecutor discriminated against the black defen-
dant in his or her particular case, and in previous cases against other black
defendants as well.3" The fact that prosecutors in defendant Swain's county
had employed the peremptory since 1 953 to exclude blacks from any petit jury
was not "systematic" enough to rebut the presumption of prosecutorial validity
of the challenge.39
Undoubtedly, the heart of Swain was the recognition that the peremptory
is the most effective method of identifying and excluding those jurors most
strongly biased in favor of the opposition - something the challenge for cause
does not allow.4" Reliance on the peremptory is at a premium in criminal trials
because attorneys have "less than perfect information about the predisposi-
tions and hidden biases of prospective jurors."41 In such trials monetary con-
siderations preclude use of innovative juror information techniques. 2 At-
torneys are forced to "rely on stereotypes, common sense judgments and even
common prejudices in deciding whether a juror with a given age, race, sex,
religion, ethnic background, and occupation will act impartially toward a par-
ticular defendant." '43 The peremptory has allowed litigants to rely on these con-
siderations and exclude petit jurors accordingly. Not requiring a reason for
peremptorily challenging a juror "avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most
common stereotypes," and essentially "allows the covert expression of what we
dare not say but know is true more often than not." '44 The Supreme Court's
refusal in Swain45 to impose judicial scrutiny on the peremptory facilitated its
salutary effects.
Why, then, did the Batson Court find that the peremptory challenge is a
jury selection practice that "has been used to discriminate against black
jurors?"" A number of factors can be attributed to justify the Batson holding.
6Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965).
371d.
3'See id.
9Swain, 380 U.S. at 224-26.
'Challenges for cause are exercised on a showing of actual or implied bias, which renders the juror preju-
diced to impartially hear a case. However, if the scope of voir dire is limited, there is little opportunity for
counsel to probe for biases that will give rise to a challenge for cause. See Saltzburg and Powers, supra note I
at 339-40. Furthermore, even where counsel exposes juror bias, often times a challenge for cause is over-
ruled, as long as the potential juror states that he or she can put all biases aside for the particular case at
hand. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 550 (1975).
4
'Saltzburg and Powers, supra note I at 342.
'See Okun, Investigation of Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEO. L.J. 839
(1968) for a discussion of various investigative methods and techniques utilized to obtain information about
prospective jurors.
"Saltzburg and Powers, supra note 1, at 342.
"Babcock, supra note 40, at 553-54.
"1380 U.S. 202 (1965).
'Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 (1986).
[Vol. 20:2
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One is simply history. Justice Powell placed much emphasis on the an-
tidiscrimination principles emanating from the "venire cases," 7 in which the
Court consistently struck down state attempts to systematically exclude blacks
from the jury venire.18 Such discrimination was held to violate the defendant's
right to an impartial jury whether by force of statutes that purposefully exclud-
ed members of the black race, 9 or through facially neutral statutes that were
discriminatory in application. These cases stood for the proposition that racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors harms the accused.5' The majority
followed Strauder v. West Virginia,52 which is characterized as "the most
vigorous statement of the antidiscrimination principle to be found in the
United States for a full century after emancipation."53 Such a description is
warranted by the broad and sweeping language of Strauder:
The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed ... The very idea of a jury is a
body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it
is selected ... to determine ... and is the grand bulwark of his liberties 5 ...
In view of these considerations.., how can it be maintained that compel-
ling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a
panel from which the state has expressly excluded every man of his race,
because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a
denial of equal legal protection?5
Swain56 effectively thwarted Strauder's57 broad commitment to non-discrimina-
tory jury selection by insulating the peremptory from attack when used at the
petit jury level.
The Batson majority disposed of the Swain requirements58 and invoked
post-Swain equal protection principles designed to allow claimants to raise a
prima facie case of discrimination on an individual basis59 rather than show an
"See supra note 3.
4Id.
"9Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) involved a legislative attempt at such exclusion. It provided
as follows: "All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this state shall
be liable to serve as jurors..." Id. at 305.
-See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
"See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-310.
-100 U.S. 303 (1880).
"Schmidt, Juries, Jurisdiction and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61
TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1414 (1983). The author explains that the Court committed itself in uncompromising
terms to the newly freed blacks, Id. at 1417, and created not an affirmative right to presence on any jury, but
the right not to be discriminatorily excluded from any jury, Id. at 1421.
"Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 [quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *3491.
I"Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
-380 U.S. 202 (1965).
"100 U.S. 303 (1880).
"See supra note 9, and accompanying text. One author notes that it "strains credence" to attribute the ap-
proximate fifteen year absence of blacks in Swain from the petit jury on any other factor than racial
discrimination. Comment, supra note 9, at 1161.
"See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Fall, 19861 R ECENT CASES
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official pattern of racial discrimination. The black defendant need not "make
some kind of showing with respect to the prosecutor's conduct and the motives
behind it in earlier trials extending over an indefinite period of time, trials in
which he was not involved and regarding which his opportunities for gathering
evidence [werel severely restricted."60 Abrogating the Swain requirement
alleviated the evidentiary burden of showing that "several must suffer
discrimination ... before [one] ... could object."61
The Court then proceeded to re-examine "the conflict between the right
to use the peremptory challenge and a defendant's right to be tried by a fair
and impartial jury."62 In light of Strauder and its progeny's firm resolve to rem-
edy racial discrimination, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause
compelled the latter.63 "Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States
to exclude black persons from the venire ... it [also] forbids the States to strike
black veniremen [from the petit jury] on the assumption that they will be biased
in a particular case simply because the defendant is black."" Thus, the Court
squarely addressed these views which they failed to do in Swain,6 for "elemen-
tary principles of constitutional law dating from Marbury v. Madison" would
... have required that the peremptory challenge yield to the ... constitutional
right [of equal protection]."'" Additionally, Stilson v. United States" held that
the peremptory challenge is not a right granted under the sixth amendment.69
The linchpin of the Batson decision is its recognition of a causal connec-
tion between use of the peremptory and discrimination against black jurors, a
reality which manifested itself in the form of much litigation." The problem is
especially evident where the minority representation venire is less than the
number of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges."1 In such instances, the
prosecution can peremptorily exclude all blacks, producing an all-white jury."2
"Comment, supra note 9, at 1161.
"McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
62Note, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Mtss.
L.J. 157, 158 (1967).
OSee Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
"'Id. at 1723.
65380 U.S. 202 (1965).
65 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
"Comment, supra note 9, at 1164 Iciting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)]. "If then the
courts are to regard the Constitution; and the Constitution is superior to any ... act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply." Marbury, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) at 178.
-250 U.S. 583 (1919).
6"Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586.
"See J.M. VAN DYKE, supra note I at 173-174 nn. 83-97 for a list of cases involving the exclusion of blacks
through use of the peremptory challenge; See also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 n.2 (2nd Cir.
1984) for a list of federal cases involving same.
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APPLICATION OF BATSONS EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS TO AREA'S OTHER
THAN RACE
Although the central focus of the Court's opinion was its concern over
racially discriminatory jury selection procedures, there is inherent support in
Batson for its extension to other groups as well. For example, the Court ex-
plains that those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen."73 Their com-
petency as jurors will ultimately turn upon their ability to impartially consider
the evidence at trial apart from any considerations of race.' These principles
presuppose that sex and national origin are also unrelated to juror capability.
The majority points out that "equal protection ... would be meaningless were
we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of ... assumptions which
arise solely from the juror's race."'" Read in its broader sense, the Batson Court
is condemning stereotypic assumptions which flow from group associations;
logically, this should include sex and national origin as well.
Along with Batson 's internal support for this extension to non-racial
groups, there is recent federal and state court support for this proposition.
McCray v. Abrams 6, People v. Wheeler", and Commonwealth v.
Soares"8 have carved out sixth amendment limitations on the peremptory chal-
lenge similar to those imposed in Batson. The sixth amendment, according to
the court in Taylor v. Louisiana,'9 guarantees every criminal defendant the
right to a jury venire drawn from a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity in order to ensure that the "broad representative character of the jury...
be maintained."80 McCray,8" Wheeler,"' and Soares8' have extended this re-
quirement so that the petit jury is judged by the same standard, a proposition
Taylor refused to entertain.' To promote a representative cross-section at the
petit jury level, these courts held that members of an identifiable group could
not be peremptorily challenged for mere membership in that group." Jurors
"Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986).
1'd. at 1723.
75Id.
6750 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1984).
"22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
"'377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
"419 U.S. 522 (1975).
10ld. at 530 (emphasis added).
"750 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1984).
u22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
3377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
-419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). The Court imposed no requirement "that petit juries actually chosen must mirror
the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population," and stated that "Idlefendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition..." Id.
"See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1984); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979).
R ECENT CASESFall, 19861
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from these groups could be challenged only for a specific bias"6 or other neutral
criteria." This is similar to the "neutral explanation" requirement set forth in
Batson. 1
The inherent difficulty that arises is determing "group cognizability.""
The tests formulated for making this determination have permitted group
cognizability to encompass religion, age, economic status, race, sex and na-
tional origin." "Additionally, [tihe burden of rebutting a prima facie case [of
identifiable group exclusion] becomes problematic if the prosecutor must ex-
plain every occurrence of disproportionate cognizable group exclusion."'
The problems posed could be avoided by extending Batson only to those
groups traditionally protected under equal protection. Equal protection con-
templates a narrower ground for its applicability than does the group cogniza-
bility standard. It has evolved to protect mainly those members of a suspect
class,9" or those members either burdened by an immutable characteristic93 or
some semblance of historical discrimination,9 ' it would seemingly exclude re-
ligion and economic status or any other group otherwise deemed cognizable.95
16People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282, 583 P.2d 748, 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (1978); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 491, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517, cert denied 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
'McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2nd Cir. 1984).
" 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). It is submitted that, although the language in Wheeler. Spares, McCray. and Batson
requiring a reason for the peremptory challenging of black jurors varies, all four decisions are bound by a
common thread: they require the prosecution to somehow provide a justification for the exclusion that need
not rise to the level of a challenge for cause.
"See Note, supra note 71 at 1365 n.55. The author cites the three prong test of Willis v. Zant, 720 F. 2d
1212 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert denied. 467 U.S. 1256 (1984) that requires (1) that the group be defined by some
factor or composition, (2) that a basic similarity in attitude or ideas run through the group, and (3) that the
community of interest is significant enough to impair the group's ability to be represented if excluded from
the jury selection process. Determining whether this test is satisfied would be a question of fact insofar as
group cognizability may differ based on time or place.
"See Note, supra note 72, at 1365.
"'Rethinking Limitations. supra note 7 I, at 1369.
"See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("IAIII legal restriclions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect..." and "courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
"
3See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (classifications based on gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives).
'See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 ( 197 1) (aliens entitled to equal protection scrutiny because of
their status as a discrete and insular minority).
"Professor Tribe, in L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) highlights the circumstances which
give rise to the invocation of strict or intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Strict scruti-
ny analysis has been triggered to invalidate governmental action aimed at prejudicing "discrete and insular
minorities." Id. at 1052 [quoting United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)]. Deni-
al or interference with a "preferred" interest, or the employment of stereotypic or otherwise sensitive classifi-
cations has invited the protection of intermediate scrutiny. L. TRIBE. supra note 95 at 1090. It is submitted
that the aforementioned standards are more stringent than the tests formulated for determining group cog-
nizability, See supra note 89, and accompanying text, and would therefore allow for a narrower class of
those protected. See also note, supra note 71 at 1372-77. One author explains certain factors which support
the premise that Wheeler. Soares and McCray have equal protection underpinnings, notwithstanding their
application of a sixth amendment limitation on the peremptory challenge. First, all three courts were con-
cerned with vindicating the effects of race discrimination, which has evolved under an equal protection
framework. Further, provisions of the California and Massachusetts state constitutional provisions relied
[Vol. 20:2
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PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: A "CATCH-22" SITUATION
Even assuming that Batson and lower court precedents provide the foun-
dation for reaching non-racial groups, little equal protection will result if these
decisions lack practical application. The Marshall concurrence96 and the
Burger dissent97 both examine Batson 's practical deficiencies, but from dif-
ferent perspectives.
Marshall's opinion focuses on the practical problems a trial judge will face
in determining whether the peremptory was used to serve discriminatory
ends.98 A less than total peremptory exclusion of blacks, coupled with
reasonably specific non-racial criteria for the prosecutor's action, would in all
probability not even make out a prima facie case according to Marshall.9
Hence, the systematic exclusion of blacks at the petit jury level would continue
since the discrimination is held to an "acceptable" level."° Furthermore, once a
prima facie case is established, the peremptory affords ample opportunity to
bury prosecutorial intent to discriminate. 10
It is readily apparent from the majority opinion how this scenario could
occur. The majority concludes that "the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose."'0 Thus, prosecutors approach-
ing voir dire with an eye towards discrimination could articulate a series of
questions that lay the necessary foundation for exclusion of black jurors based
on any non-racial criteria elicited during the examination. King v. County of
Nassau"°3 is illustrative. In King, counsel for a community college defending
employment discrimination charges peremptorily challenged the only two
blacks on the petit jury panel. Defense counsel argued that "when the two
[black] jurors ... were asked questions ... they responded.., in a manner that
I found less than open, less than communicative ... the black jurors were re-
moved physically, emotionally from the white jurors ... and presented ... an
inability to really objectively deliberate.. .,"10 This argument was held to be
sufficient.105
upon by the Wheeler and Soares court, respectively, contain strong equal protection language. Note, supra
note 7 1.
'Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1726 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
17Id. at 1731 (Burger, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 1727-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"Id.
" id. at 1728.
10Id.
"'Id. at 1723.
"'581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
"'Id. at 495.
105Id.
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The central thrust of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson, on the other
hand, is that attempting to limit application of the peremptory for any reason
is unsound.' °0 This view is based on the premise that "Jalnalytically, there is no
middle ground: A challenge either has to be explained or it does not."'' 7 Com-
pelling any type of reason for the peremptory would cause it to collapse into a
challenge for cause. tJ
Ironically, both Marshall and Burger are correct in their assessment of the
majority opinion. The limitation imposed by the peremptory is now "semi-
arbitrary."'1° The inherent flaw in the majority opinion is that the peremptory
challenge allows too much latitude to circumvent the non-discriminatory selec-
tion of jurors."0 As a result, trial judges will be forced to make a subjective
determination of whether prosecutorial use of the challenge rises to the level of
invidious discrimination."'
CONCLUSION
Arguably Batson 's force, if any, will lie in the deterrent effect it will have
upon prosecutors. Presumably, they will now be hesitant to exclude all black
jurors from the petit jury, thereby allowing for some black representation on
the black defendant's jury. However, since Batson places much emphasis on a
trial judge's ability to identify prosecutorial intent to discriminate, Batson lacks
the necessary "teeth" required to ensure that black jurors are not excluded on
the basis of race. However, Batson does stand for two fundamental proposi-
tions: First, that the black defendant now enjoys equal protection of the laws
throughout the entire jury selection process; and second, that the peremptory
challenge has been recognized as a tool of invidious discrimination. Given
these two prescripts, Batson has arguably laid the necessary foundation for
banning the peremptory altogether."'
BRIAN WILSON





"'Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase. 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 287 (1968).
"'Batson. 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.22. The note highlights the Court's reliance on the ability of the trial judge
during voir dire to discern a prima facia case of discrimination from the interplay between the prosecution
and the prospective jurors.
'Id at 1726 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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